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Mclntyre does not dispute Plaintiffs' principal argument on appeal, i.e., that 
potential injury or the increased risk of injury constitutes "injury-in-fact" for standing 
purposes. As stated by the Seventh Circuit, although an injury may be "probabilistic," 
"even a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy" and thus 
give rise to standing. Village of Elk Grove v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Instead, Mclntyre demands that Plaintiffs plead standing - including injury-in-fact and 
causation - with great specificity. But that is clearly not the law in Utah where notice 
pleading applies as much to standing as to the elements of a claim. Plaintiffs have 
pleaded more than enough to establish standing. 
After rushing ahead and building his bridge despite the pendency of this lawsuit, 
Mclntyre also insists this Court is barred from reviewing the correctness of the trial 
court's ruling because the case is now moot. That is wrong for various reasons, including 
that it would reward parties for ignoring on-going legal proceedings and insulate 
erroneous trial court rulings from appellate review. Central to Mclntyre's mootness 
argument is the false assertion that Plaintiffs stood idly by while he built his bridge. In 
fact, Plaintiffs sought a TRO as soon as they noticed construction activities, but the trial 
court denied relief. The reality is that, rather than seek an extension for his permit or 
other appropriate relief to preserve his permit rights, Mclntyre ran the risk that he would 
not prevail and that the bridge would have to be removed. If that happens, he has only 
himself to blame. Moreover, the Complaint seeks any other legal or equitable relief that 
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can remedy Plaintiffs' injuries. Even assuming the bridge had to stay, that would not 
preclude other legal or equitable remedies. This appeal is by no means moot. 
Mclntyre repeatedly confuses the minimal requirements for pleading standing with 
the more substantial requirements for prevailing on the merits. For puiposes of standing, 
the allegations in the Complaint and attached exhibits are more than sufficient. Whether 
Plaintiffs can ultimately establish the merits of their claims is an issue for further 
proceedings in the trial court, not a matter of standing. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
AND PROCEDURAL ASSERTIONS 
There are no factual disputes in this appeal, nor can there be. As he must, 
Mclntyre "concedes that for motion to dismiss purposes, all the factual allegations of 
Appellants' complaint are taken as true." Brief of Appellee ("Aplee E$r.") at 8. He also 
"concedes" the Statement of Facts set forth in the opening brief. Id. at 4. 
Mclntyre seeks to supplement these undisputed facts by asserting a few of his 
own. He helpfully highlights the Secor Report's conclusion that his bridge "'increases 
the risk'" of "'further erosion and potential property damage.'" Id, ^ 3. But then he 
makes the irrelevant assertion that Plaintiffs do not own property directly adjoining the 
west bank of the creek or on the first level flood plain. Id., f 1. As reiterated below, the 
issue is potential property damage from Mclntyre's actions, be it direct or indirect, not 
whether Plaintiffs are adjoining property owners or in the direct path of a flood. 
Although it may be true that the "flooding and erosion" would not be to Plaintiffs' 
properties in the first instance, the Complaint specifically alleges thait "[s]uch an event 
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will cause significant erosion and damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners 
adjacent to the bridge." Record on Appeal ("R.") 5-6. Where one property depends on 
another for lateral support, flooding and erosion to one can easily affect the other. The 
Complaint includes such allegations. R. 4-6. 
Mclntyre notes that the permit had an expiration date of October 11, 2007 (Aplee 
Br. at 4, [^ 2), a fact he uses to suggest he had no choice but to proceed to build his bridge 
(id. at 1). Yet the permit also states that the "expiration date [could] be extended, at the 
State Engineer's discretion, by submitting a written request outlining the need for the 
extension and the reasons for the delay in completing the proposed stream alteration." 
Id, Add-A, |^ 1. Nothing in the record indicates that Mclntyre requested such an 
extension pending the outcome of this litigation. 
Mclntyre also asserts that the deck of the bridge is designed to be lifted off during 
spring flooding. Id. at 4, f 4. That may be true, but there's no assurance that it will or 
even can be removed in time to avoid the alleged risks - flash floods do not announce 
themselves ahead of time. Whether a removable deck can adequately mitigate the alleged 
risks is a merits question for further factual development in the trial court, not an issue of 
standing. 
Mclntyre states that construction of the bridge "openly and obviously proceeded 
without Appellants seeking to enjoin it" while the Motion to Dismiss was being briefed. 
Id. at 2. Quite the contrary, on March 22, 2007, Plaintiffs learned that Mclntyre had 
commenced construction activities. R. 166. There is no suggestion in the record that 
Mclntyre engaged in any construction activities prior to that date or that Plaintiffs had 
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any notice thereof. The very next day, March 23, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. R. 159. After an in camera 
hearing that same day, the trial court denied the motion. R. 212. The court did not make 
findings of fact or conclusions of law based on the TRO hearing. The minute entry 
denying the motion merely states, "There is no irreparable harm." Id. The court directed 
Mclntyre to prepare an appropriate order, but none appears in the record. Id. 
Finally, Mclntyre asserts that the trial court "relied upon the facts adduced at the 
March 23, 2007 [TRO] hearing during the April 16, 2007 [Motion to Dismiss] hearing 
which is at issue here." Aplee Br. at 5. That is not accurate. The only reference to the 
facts "adduced" at the TRO hearing included in the record of the April 16 hearing is that 
the trial court "got the lay of the land" at the TRO hearing (and hence was familiar with 
the case), not that it relied on prior factual findings to reach its decision on the Motion to 
Dismiss. R. 252, at p. 3 Ins. 9-18. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Allegations in the Complaint Must be Presumed True; Notice 
Pleading Applies to Standing; the Attached Exhibits are Part of the 
Complaint. 
Mclntyre freely concedes that the allegations in the Complaint must be taken as 
true, but then refuses to acknowledge the implications of that concession. Utah is a 
notice pleading state where detailed pleading is unnecessary to state a viable cause of 
action. "[U]nder Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that 
the pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted 
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Power & Light, 
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969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says a 
complaint "shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (emphasis added). Nothing more is 
required to state a claim. 
These minimal requirements apply equally to issues of standing - that is, there are 
no heightened pleading requirements for standing. See Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club 
v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, [^32, 148 P.3d 960 (allegations of standing are "all 
that is required at this phase"). Moreover, it is well established that u[w]hen reviewing a 
trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, [the appellate court] accept[s] the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and considers] them and all reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Trillium USA, Inc. v. 
Board of County Commissioners, 2001 UT 101, 37 P.3d 1093 (citations and quotation 
marks omitted; emphasis added). 
Accordingly, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 
resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice [to establish standing], for on a 
motion to dismiss, [the court] presume[s] that general allegations embrace those specific 
facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 561 (1992). By contrast, Mclntyre's argument improperly demands extremely 
detailed pleading regarding standing. As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs' allegations on 
standing are more than sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 
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Mclntyre also fails to appreciate the role of an exhibit to a complaint, such as the 
Secor Report. By rule, "[a]n exhibit or pleading is a part [of the complaint] for all 
purposes/' Utah R. Civ. P. 10(c) (emphasis added). 
Mclntyre quotes Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983), for the proposition 
that while an exhibit attached to a complaint "may be considered as a part of a pleading 
to clarify or explain the same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose of 
supplying necessary material averments, and the content of the exhibit is not to be taken 
as part of the allegations of the pleading itself" Id. at 248; see Aplee B>r. at 8. However, 
Mclntyre's suggestion that Girard precludes reference to the Secor Report to flesh out 
some of the standing details is incorrect. In Girard, the complaint raised a single claim. 
The plaintiff contended that an attachment to the complaint was sufficient to raise other 
claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. 660 P.2d at 248. The Utah Supreme 
Court refused to allow an attachment to substitute for the basic allegations necessary to 
plead a claim. While Girard might bar Plaintiffs from attempting to rely on the Secor 
Report to state a claim for, say, nuisance when the Complaint makes no such allegation, 
that is not how Plaintiffs seek to use it here. Just as Girard allows, the Secor Report was 
attached to the Complaint to "clarify and explain" the claims and allegations already 
pleaded. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for this Court to consider the Secor Report in 
determining whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged standing. In any event, as 
explained next, the allegations in the Complaint alone are sufficient to plead standing. 
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B. The Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Injury-in-Fact to Establish 
Standing. 
Mclntyre's standing argument is noticeably thin on supporting case law. He 
concedes that Plaintiffs have "correctly set forth the analysis necessary to determine 
whether a party has standing." Aplee Br. at 7. Mclntyre quotes the Utah Supreme 
Court's statement in Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 
58, 82 P.3d 1125, that to establish standing a plaintiff must "'show that he has or would 
suffer a distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome."5 
Aplee Br. at 8 (quoting Morgan, 2003 UT, ^17) (citations omitted; Mclntyre's emphasis 
omitted). The "distinct and palpable injury" language is just another way of saying that 
the plaintiff would suffer an injury-in-fact, while the "personal stake" language 
underscores that a principal concern of the standing inquiry is to ensure that courts do not 
adjudicate general or ideological grievances best addressed through the political 
branches. See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1983); Brief of Appellants 
at 7-9. 
Mclntyre asserts that Plaintiffs failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury. 
Aplee Br. at 8-10. That is simply false. Plaintiffs' Complaint clearly satisfies Rule 8(a) 
with respect to standing. The relevant portions of the Complaint state as follows: 
19. The approved bridge will be in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 73-3-29(4)(b) in that it will diminish the stream's ability to 
conduct high water flows and thereby increase the risk and danger of 
flooding, and in the event flooding occurs, the surrounding stream 
environment will be unnecessarily and adversely affected. 
20. Construction of the proposed bridge and access ramps will 
alter the stream's channel, and thereby diminish the natural channel's 
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ability to conduct high water flows, heighten the potential for damming, 
and thereby increase the risk of flooding in the surrounding areas. 
21. As observed in the Spring of 1984, the location of the bridge 
is already in an area of high flood risk. The approved bridge, if constructed 
will only enhance the already high flood risk and danger to the Plaintiffs 
and other surrounding properties and landowners. 
22. In the event flooding occurs due in whole or in part to the 
construction of the proposed bridge, the natural stream environment will be 
adversely affected and potentially destroyed by the invading flood waters. 
23. In conjunction with Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration, 
Plaintiffs submitted a Hydrological Evaluation prepared by Secor 
International. See Secor Report, attached as Exhibit "F." 
24. The Secor Report demonstrates that the approved bridge 
design provides for a one-foot clearance over a high water mark of 526 
cubic feet per second. On June 1, 1984, the flow through Little 
Cottonwood Creek exceeded 70% of the design water height flow (a water 
depth of 6.58 feet, or a water flow of 898 cubic feet per second). Water 
flow like that experienced in 1984 would flow over, and significantly 
increase the stress on, the bridge as approved. 
25. The Secor Report also demonstrates that if flows similar to 
those in 1984 are experienced in the stream channel (as altered by 
construction of the approved bridge), the erosion could cause the stream 
banks to overflow and inundate the first level flood plain on both sides of 
the stream in the vicinity of the bridge. Such an event will cause significant 
erosion and damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to 
the bridge. 
R. 4-6 (emphasis added). 
Taken as true, these allegations - and all reasonable inferences drawn from them -
establish that Mclntyre's bridge will alter the natural stream flow, increase the risk of 
damming and flooding, and, if such flooding occurs, "cause significant erosion and 
damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge." Thus, the 
Complaint specifically alleges a particularized injury-in-fact - damage to both of the 
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Plaintiffs' properties as a result of erosion and flooding caused or exacerbated (it doesn't 
matter which) by Mclntyre's bridge.1 This alone is more than sufficient to satisfy the 
notice-pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Even if such allegations are deemed general 
(they are actually quite specific), as noted already, "[a]t the pleading stage . . . [the court] 
presumefs] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to 
support the claim." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. There is no requirement that a plaintiff plead 
with specificity each link in a chain of events that ultimate results in injury. It is enough 
to allege that the defendant has caused or will cause injury to the plaintiff or his property. 
Nothing more is required to demonstrate that a plaintiff has a "personal stake" in the 
litigation rather than a nonjusticiable generalized grievance. 
Mclntyre misunderstands the requirement that a plaintiff must have a 
"particularized" injury to have standing. He treats the requirement as some sort of 
heightened pleading standard - that a plaintiff must plead an injury-in-fact with 
particularity, much as fraud must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b). But 
when courts say that plaintiffs must plead a "particularized" injury for standing purposes, 
they mean only that the injury must be unique (particular) to the plaintiffs and not a 
"general interest [t]he[y] sharef] in common with members of the public at large." 
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149. As noted in the opening brief, Plaintiffs here are not 
1
 Mclntyre attempts to draw a distinction between the potential risks to the Sorensens' 
and Browns' properties. Aplee Br. at 8-10. However, the Complaint alleges injury to the 
properties of the "Plaintiffs," a term that includes both families. That the Browns might 
face a greater risk than the Sorensens does not alter the standing analysis or suggest the 
Sorensens lack standing. Both face risks from Mclntyre's bridge and thus both have a 
personal stake in the litigation giving rise to standing. 
9 
analogous to "roving environmental ombudsm[e]n seeking to right environmental wrongs 
wherever [t]hey find them," but rather are "real person[s] who own[] real home[s] . . . in 
close proximity" to Little Cottonwood Creek, the proposed bridge, and the threatened 
flooding and erosion. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 157 (4th 
Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs have pleaded a "particularized" injury. 
Even if the Complaint's allegations weren't enough, Plaintiffs also attached the 
Secor Report to their Complaint, which provides some additional detail regarding 
Plaintiffs' injury-in-fact: 
Building the proposed bridge . . . could create a channel constriction - a 
point in the channel which would, under high flow conditions, providfe] an 
opportunity for typical debris, vegetation/trees, rocks, and any other urban 
materials to catch, backing up water. If the stream flow is backed up, 
inundation of the 1st level flood plane on both sides of the stream channel 
is at significant risk. 
The Brown Residence is located on the river terrace, directly above the 
escarpment along the west side of the Creek. With the instabilities 
observed in and around the escarpment, as well as the settlement cracks, 
further erosion at the escarpment may increase the risks for significant 
property damage. As proposed, construction of the bridge could increase 
the potential for further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the 
potential for significant property damage or worse. 
R. 64 (emphasis added). 
Mclntyre argues that Plaintiffs are in no danger of "flooding" because "neither of 
the Appellants live in the first level flood plane as does Mclntyre." Aplee Br. at 9. But 
direct "flooding" is not the injury Plaintiffs allege. As set forth in the Complaint and the 
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Secor Report, it is the erosion and consequent loss of lateral support caused by flooding 
that seriously threaten Plaintiffs' properties. 
Mclntyre also asserts that "in Appellants' response to Mclntyre's motion to 
dismiss they failed to inform the court below of the nature of the damage which might 
befall their property if Mclntyre were to construct a bridge. Appellants simply relied 
upon the allegations of their complaint." Aplee Br. at 9. Of course, on a motion to 
dismiss, relying on the allegations in the pleadings is entirely proper. See Valley Colour, 
Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 362 (Utah 1997) ("[T]he purpose of a rule 
12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to 
establish the facts or resolve the merits of the case.") (internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted).2 Moreover, Mclntyre fails to cite any case law requiring that a 
plaintiff plead a detailed explanation of the "nature" of alleged property damage - and 
indeed there is none because Utah is a notice-pleading state where detailed allegations are 
not required at the pleading stage. But regardless, the assertion is false. Plaintiffs' 
memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss could not have been clearer about 
the nature of the alleged injury: 
[T]he construction of the bridge has the potential of causing significant 
damage to the Plaintiffs. While the Plaintiffs' properties are not located on 
the 1st level flood plane, flooding of the first level will cause further 
erosion of the escarpment, increasing the potential "for significant property 
damage or worse." . . . . [The escarpment] provides lateral support to the 
Browns' home. . . .[E]rosion to the west bank escarpment has already 
Such assertions are consistent with Mclntyre's tack throughout his brief, which is to act 
as though he prevailed on the merits and that Plaintiffs somehow failed to submit 
evidence to support their claims. Because this was a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs had no 
duty to put forth evidence of standing. They merely had to allege it, as they amply did. 
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caused significant settlement and signs of collapse to occur on the Browns' 
property, and in their home. Accelerated erosion resulting from flooding 
on the 1st level flood plane caused by flow restriction of the proposed 
bridge, as explained by Secor, will result in additional settlement, collapse 
and ultimately the destruction of the Browns' property. Correspondingly, 
the Sorensen property is also situated above and adjacent to the property 
lying directly in the first level flood plane. Damage to that property will 
undermine the lateral support to the Sorenson property. Simply put a flood 
on the 1st level flood plane will impair the integrity of the property 
providing lateral support to the Plaintiffs' homes. 
R. 130-31 (emphasis added). 
Mclntyre argues that Plaintiffs have suffered no injury because the escarpment is 
already eroding and has been for a long time but has never collapsed. Aplee Br. at 10. 
Mclntyre's argument (notably without support in the record) is irrelevant. The point is 
that Mclntyre's bridge increases the risk and danger of flooding and erosion - a fact 
Mclntyre has conceded for purposes of this appeal. As Plaintiffs amply demonstrated in 
their opening brief, "increased risk . . . constitutes cognizable harm." Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Sutton v. St. 
Jude Medical S.C. Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[CJourts have long 
recognized that an increased risk of harm . . . is an injury-in-fact"). Mclntyre's brief 
makes no attempt to refute the numerous cases Plaintiffs cited to support this point. If on 
remand Mclntyre wants to put on expert testimony to try to show that the risk to 
Plaintiffs' properties is minimal because this escarpment has never collapsed, he will be 
free to do so, just as Plaintiffs will be free to put on contrary evidence. But the 
magnitude of the risk is an issue for the merits, not a question of standing. 
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C. Plaintiffs Complaint Pleads Causation. 
Mclntyre also contends that Plaintiffs have "failed to establish any causal 
connection between the stream alteration permit and increased injury to property." 
ApleeBr. at 11. Just to be clear, Plaintiffs have no duty to "establish" a causal 
connection at this point as a matter of evidence - allegations in the pleadings and 
reasonable inferences are enough. Plaintiffs have "alleged that they could prove 
causation, and that is all that is required at this phase." Sierra Club, 2006 UT, |^32. Here, 
the causal connection between the asserted injury and the permit is obvious: The permit 
allows the building of the bridge, which increases the risk of flooding, erosion, and 
property damage. No permit means no bridge, which means no increased risk of property 
damage. The Utah Supreme Court in Sierra Club held that nothing more is required. See 
id. ("Because the Executive Secretary [was] responsible for denying or granting permits 
for the construction and operation of the plant, his decision to grant the order is directly 
connected to the construction and operation of the plant and to any resulting harms."). 
D. Mclntyre Improperly Argues the Merits. 
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged an injury-in-fact and causation and therefore 
have standing. The burden Mclntyre seeks to impose at the pleading stage to "establish" 
standing is not part of Utah jurisprudence. In reality, Mclntyre's arguments are not about 
defective pleadings but rather about the merits of this case. Throughout this case, 
Mclntyre has confused the injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing with the proof 
necessary to prevail on the merits. (This problem is particularly evident in Mclntyre's 
Reply Memorandum in support of his Motion to Dismiss. R. 146-51.) 
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It is critical for courts to maintain the line between the minimal requirements -
both at the pleading and fact stages - for standing and the burden of establishing the right 
to recover on a claim. Failure to distinguish between these separate inquiries would 
result in every claim provisionally determined by the trial court to be a losing claim being 
dismissed for lack of standing. 
The Tenth Circuit in Initiative and Referendum Institute v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082 
(10th Cir. 2006) (en banc), emphasized this important point. In Walker, six wildlife and 
animal advocacy groups sued alleging that Utah's super-majority requirement for wildlife 
initiatives chilled their First Amendment free-speech rights. On the merits of the issue, 
the court called the claim "farfetched." Id. at 1093. "Although the First Amendment 
protects political speech incident to an initiative campaign, it does not protect the right to 
make law, by initiative or otherwise." Id. at 1099. In other words, the plaintiffs had 
suffered no First Amendment injury because the right they asserted was not protected. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing: 
For purposes of standing, the question cannot be whether the 
Constitution, properly interpreted, extends protection to the plaintiffs 
asserted right or interest. If that were the test, every losing claim would be 
dismissed for want of standing. Take, for example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) The Buckley Court held, in effect, that there 
is no First Amendment right to make unlimited campaign contributions. 
Under the Defendants' theory, one might say that a would-be campaign 
benefactor has no "legally protected interest" in making unlimited 
campaign contributions, and that the Supreme Court should have tossed the 
case on standing grounds. But that would put the merits cart before the 
standing horse. The First Amendment claim in this case differs from that in 
Buckley only because it is more farfetched. But its far-fetchedness is a 
question to be determined on the merits. For purposes of standing, we must 
assume that Plaintiffs' claim has legal validity. . . . [f] . . . . [WJhere the 
plaintiff presents a nonfrivolous legal challenge, alleging an injury to a 
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protected right such as free speech, the federal courts may not dismiss for 
lack of standing on the theory that the underlying interest is not legally 
protected. 
Id. at 1092-93 (internal citations omitted). 
So it is here. Mclntyre may argue that Plaintiffs' claim is "farfetched" - that there 
is very little chance that his bridge will cause flooding or that flooding could ever erode 
lateral support to Plaintiffs' properties. He may argue that the law does not protect 
against these risks until they actually occur, as he asserted below. R. 252. But these are 
merits arguments. Does the law protect against the risk of flooding and erosion? How 
imminent or great must that risk be? How imminent is that risk in this case? These are 
among the factual and legal questions that constitute the merits of this case. They are not 
matters of standing. The trial court erred - and Mclntyre seeks to perpetuate that error on 
appeal - in conflating the standing inquiry with the merits of the case. 
E. Plaintiffs' Claims are Redressable and not Moot. 
Mclntyre argues this case is moot because the permit has expired and he has 
already built his bridge. Aplee Br. at 12-13. This Court has already denied Mclntyre's 
motion to dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds. Mclntyre has failed to satisfy his 
heavy burden of demonstrating mootness. See Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Gordon, 
849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy 
one."). He offers essentially no legal support and barely a page of argument to support 
3
 On September 4, 2007, Mclntyre filed a Suggestion of Mootness (essentially a motion 
to dismiss the appeal) with this Court. Plaintiffs responded on September 19, 2007, 
demonstrating that the appeal is not moot. This Court denied the motion on September 
25, 2007. 
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his position - no binding or persuasive case authority is cited. See State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (1988) ("A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which [a] party may dump 
the burden of argument and research.") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
At any rate, Mclntyre's mootness argument is contrary to the law. "An issue on 
appeal is considered moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the 
litigants." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This case is not moot because this Court and/or the trial court have power to 
restore the status quo by ordering the bridge removed. "It has long been established that 
where a defendant with notice in an injunction proceeding completes the acts sought to be 
enjoined the court may by mandatory injunction restore the status quo." Porter v. Lee, 
328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946); 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3533.3, at 278-79 (1984) (A case is not moot if the court 
has the "ability to undo the effects of conduct that was not prevented by the time of the 
decision."). 
For example, in Columbus Board of Zoning Appeals v. Wetherald, 605 N.E.2d 208 
(Ind. App. 1992), the Board of Zoning Appeals denied a variance to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff prevailed on appeal to the trial court and proceeded to construct and open his 
restaurant while the case was before the appellate court. The plaintiff argued that the 
case had become moot, but the appellate court disagreed: 
[Cjontrary to [plaintiffs] contention, the appeal is not moot.. . . We cannot 
sanction [plaintiffs] construction pending appeal as creating mootness; 
otherwise, those seeking variances for construction purposes could 
16 
circumvent zoning requirements by simply constructing in accordance with 
permits issued, although final resolution of the propriety of such variances 
was still pending on appeal. [Plaintiff] proceeded to build at his own peril 
prior to a final resolution of the variance issues. 
Id. at 210 (emphasis added). 
It is difficult to imagine how the law could be otherwise, since a different rule 
would reward litigation delay tactics and often preclude appellate courts from addressing 
the correctness of trial court decisions. If the permit was improperly issued in this case, 
then construction of the bridge was illegal from the beginning and Mclntyre could be 
ordered to remove the bridge. 
Mclntyre has not argued (much less demonstrated) that the circumstances of this 
case are so materially changed since its inception that meaningful relief can no longer be 
granted. Mclntyre himself says the bridge can be easily removed from its footings, so 
impossibility is not an issue. Aplee Br. at 11. Among the factors courts consider to 
determine whether material changes in circumstances render relief moot are: (1) the 
relative fault or blameworthiness of the defendant in completing a project against which a 
permanent injunction is sought, (2) whether the plaintiff sought some form of temporary 
or preliminary injunctive relief in order to preserve the status quo during the pendency of 
the litigation, and (3) the varied interests likely to be affected and the potential hardships 
likely to be caused if the defendant is required to undo the project. Wells v. Lodge 
Properties, Inc., 976 P.2d 321, 324-25 (Colo. App. 1998). Mclntyre meets none of these 
factors. 
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First, the fault here plainly lies with Mclntyre. He chose to construct the bridge 
while this litigation was pending and with full knowledge that he might lose and thus 
have to remove his bridge. Yet he had no compelling reason for charging ahead and 
should not be rewarded for doing so. The bridge serves no purpose besides allowing 
Mclntyre and his wife easier access to the portion of their property that sits on the other 
side of Little Cottonwood Creek. R. 113. Delaying the construction and maintaining the 
status quo until resolution of this case would have been a minor inconvenience at best. 
Mclntyre notes that the permit had an expiration date. However, Mclntyre could 
have requested a stay from the Court to prevent that date from running, but he chose not 
to. Moreover, the Division of Water Rights of the Department of Natural Resources 
along with the Utah State Engineer are defendants in this case. By law they have the 
right to grant an extension of the permit. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12. The permit 
itself states that an extension can be granted. R. 38. There is no evidence Mclntyre 
sought such an extension. In contrast, what "fault" could possibly be attributed to 
Plaintiffs? Mclntyre says, "Notably, the Appellants never sought any relief requiring the 
dismantling of the bridge. That issue was never before Judge Iwasaki, nor can it be 
here." Aplee Br. at 13. This is a red herring. Once the trial court determined that 
Plaintiffs lacked standing, they had no basis for requesting that the bridge be dismantled. 
And once it was built, the situation became no different than it is now. 
Second, Plaintiffs did try to stop construction of the bridge by seeking temporary 
injunctive relief. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order the day after 
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Mclntyre began building the bridge. R. 159, 166 ^f 14-15. Mclntyre opposed and the 
trial court denied the motion. 
Third, as to the varied interests affected, Plaintiffs are concerned about the 
preservation and structural integrity of their homes. Mclntyre has no interest of 
comparable weight. If on remand Plaintiffs can prove that Mclntyre's bridge does in fact 
place their properties at risk, then the equities would weigh strongly in their favor. 
Finally, Mclntyre ignores the fact that Plaintiffs have requested relief beyond 
enjoining construction of the bridge or revocation of the permit. Plaintiffs have requested 
"such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems appropriate under 
the circumstances." R. at 8. "[E]quity cases afford courts discretion and latitude in 
fashioning equitable remedies." Hughes v. Cqfferty, 2004 UT 22, [^24, 89 P.3d 148. 
Courts may fashion injunctions appropriate to the circumstances. See id. ]f26 ("Equitable 
remedies . . . are distinguished by their flexibility, their unlimited variety, and their 
adaptability to circumstances.") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
One equitable remedy (the best in Plaintiffs' view) would be to order the bridge 
removed and the status quo restored, but that is not the only possible remedy. The trial 
court might also enter a more limited injunction. Mclntyre says he has built a bridge that 
can be easily removed in times of flooding. Aplee Br. at 11. He rhetorically asks why, 
"when faced with such flooding of his own home and property, [he] would sit by idly." 
Id. But a flash flood may occur before he has time to remove the bridge, or the 
equipment to do so may not be available. He could be on vacation when the flood comes. 
And so on. If warranted, a more targeted injunction could order Mclntyre to remove the 
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bridge during high flood-risk seasons rather than relying on Mclntyre's voluntary 
assurance that he will remove the bridge when a flood is actually occurring. 
The point is that, even assuming arguendo the trial court were not inclined to 
order the bridge removed to restore the status quo (obviously Plaintiffs' preferred 
remedy), this case would remain a live controversy because the court may fashion other 
equitable remedies to protect Plaintiffs5 interests. "[I]n deciding a mootness issue, the 
question is not whether the precise relief sought at the time the application for an 
injunction was filed is still available. The question is whether there can be any effective 
relief." Northwest Envtl Defense Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(case not moot where plaintiffs asked court "to grant such other equitable relief as it 
deemed necessary"). The trial court on remand will have many avenues of effective 
relief to consider. This case is far from moot. 
F. Plaintiffs Had No Duty to Marshal the Evidence on Appeal from an 
Order Granting a Motion to Dismiss. 
Throughout the arguments over the standing issue, both in the trial court and on 
appeal, Mclntyre has failed to fully appreciate that the pleadings control at this stage of 
the litigation: there is no evidence to evaluate, only allegations that must be assumed 
true. Although conceding the facts in the Complaint (Aplee Br. at 8), Mclntyre 
repeatedly argues as if this appeal were from the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment or denial of a post-trial motion rather than a motion to dismiss. Consistent with 
his confusion, Mclntyre's final argument faults Plaintiffs for failing to "marshal the 
20 
evidence" by not including in the record a transcript of the in camera TRO hearing.4 
This argument is entirely misplaced. 
The "marshalling" requirement in Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure states that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." (Emphasis added.) Marshalling is often 
required when the appellant is challenging a verdict after trial or a finding of fact after an 
evidentiary hearing. But it is never necessary when appealing an order granting a motion 
to dismiss where no fact-finding occurs (or can occur) because the allegations in the 
pleadings are taken as true. Naturally, the court below made no factual findings in its 
Memorandum Decision on the Motion to Dismiss (R. 214-19) or in its Order of Dismissal 
(R. 220-21). Nor did it make any appealable factual findings at the TRO hearing; and in 
any case, this is not an appeal from that denial.5 
In short, no "fact finding" exists to challenge and there is no record evidence to 
marshal. The marshalling requirement has no application to this appeal. 
Mclntyre does not claim a transcript was even available. Aplee Br. at 14, n.2. 
5
 The denial of a temporary restraining order is subject to a discretionary interlocutory 
appeal, see Utah R. App. P. 5(a), but whether or not a TRO was properly granted or 
denied is typically moot by the time the case goes up on full appeal because the merits of 
the case will have been decided. At that point, the appeal will be from the final judgment 
- usually either granting or denying a permanent injunction - and not from the granting 
or denial of the TRO. The final relief, whether granted or denied, obviously supersedes 
the interim relief that was sought to temporarily preserve the status quo while fighting 
over the merits. It is irrelevant that Plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of the TRO. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it ruled that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this 
action. This Court should reverse the district court's order of dismissal and remand the 
case for further proceedings on the merits. 
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